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Risk Management and Corporate Governance: The
Case of Enron
ROBERT ELI ROSEN*
The challengefacing... [us] today is the adaptation of
an outdated corporate legal system to serve contempo-
rary needs.'
The Role of the Board of Directors in Enron's Collapse, which was
prepared by the United States Senate's Permanent Subcommittee on Inves-
tigations2 (the "Subcommittee") and based on an exhaustive review of evi-
dence,' found that the Enron Corporation's ("Enron") Board of Directors
(the "Board") "failed to monitor ... ensure ... or halt abuse."4 Sometimes
the Board "chose to ignore" problems, other times it "knowingly allowed
Enron to engage in high... risk practices."5 The Board also "approved an
unprecedented arrangement."6 In so doing, the Board breached its duties
"to safeguard Enron shareholders."
7
* Professor of Law, University of Miami. Email: rrosen@law.miami.edu. This Article received
speedy reads from my colleagues to whom I am most grateful. In particular, William Widen spent a
great deal of time discussing the Enron deals. I also am indebted to Caroline Bradley, Steven Diamond,
Michael Froomkin, Pat Gudridge, Gary Minda, Elliot Manning, George Mundstock, and Jonathan
Simon.
I Philip I. Blumberg, The American Law of Corporate Groups, in CORPORATE CONTROL AND
ACCOUNTABILITY: CHANGING STRUCTURES AND THE DYNAMICS OF REGULATION 342 (Joseph McCa-
hery et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter CORPORATE CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY].
2PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH
CONG., REPORT ON THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN ENRON'S COLLAPSE (Comm. Print
2002) [hereinafter ENRON'S COLLAPSE].




7Id. The Subcommittee also found unsurprisingly that there were "financial ties between the
company and certain Board members" and that the Board "approved excessive compensation for com-
pany executives." Id. They also criticized Enron for its "extensive undisclosed off-the-books activity."
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This short Article briefly explains these findings as instances of more
general problems of corporate governance. These problems derive from
the now dominant strategies of "progressive" corporate organization,
which I will name the "redesigned corporation." Enron was a redesigned
corporation.'
First, in corporations that are redesigned, projects flow bottom-up, not
top-down. In such companies, executive monitoring means analyzing risk
management reports. The Powers Report concludes that Enron's Board
"can and should be faulted for failing to demand more information, and for
failing to probe and understand the information that did come to it."9 If so,
the Board is being faulted for its reliance on risk management reports. It is
not that Enron's Board was not a monitoring board,'0 but that it poorly
monitored risk management reports.
Second, companies are redesigned to foster innovation. Such compa-
nies will take high risks, hedge or retain others risks, and seek unprece-
dented projects. Enron was "consistently voted the most innovative large
company in America in Fortune's Most Admired Companies survey.""
The governance project for redesigned companies is to manage "high risk.
• .practices."' 2 With the benefit of hindsight, some of Enron's projects
were too risky. "Too risky", in the redesigned company, means that pro-
ject risks were either improperly mitigated or unfortunately retained. It
does not mean that risks, including legal risks, are eliminated. Enron poses
the question of what duty of care attaches to the choices of mitigating and
retaining risks.
Third, in redesigned companies, borders are porous, so that providers,
suppliers, and even competitors are understood as potentially part of the
company. Redesigned companies integrate guest workers, such as down-
Id. Had the Subcommittee looked at the entire energy industry, they would have found that Enron
hardly stood alone in making use of off-the-books activities. See infra note 58.
SAMUEL E. BODILY & ROBERT F. BRUNER, ENRON: 1986-2001 (Darden Grad. Sch. Of Bus.
Adm., Univ. of Va., Darden Case No.: UVA-G-0563-M-SSRN, 2002), available at
http://www.ssm.com (last visited Feb. 22, 2003) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review); see also
infra note 48.
9WILLIAM C. POWERS JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATION
COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP. (Feb. 1, 2002) [hereinafter POWERS RE-
PORT], at http://news.findlaw.comAvp/docs/enronspecinvO2OlO2rpt1.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2003)
(on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
10 See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 3.01 (1994).
1 David Kirkpatrick, Enron Takes Its Pipeline to the Net, FORTUNE, Jan. 24, 2000, at 127. Ironi-
cally, Risk magazine named Enron the "Energy/Commodity Derivatives House of the Year" in January
2000 and in 1999 Andrew Fastow received CFO magazine's award for excellence in capital structure
management. BODILY & BRUNER, supra note 8, at 18, 26, 37; see also Terry Maxon, Trading Up;
Enron goes from sleepy utility to global e-commerce leader, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, July 2, 2000, at I H
("Enron is recognized as a global go-getter...."), LEXIS, News Library, Dalnws File.
12 ENRON'S COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 3; see infra note 41.
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sized employees rehired on a temporary basis and outside consultants.' 3 In
redesigned companies, loyalties to other companies create conflicts of in-
terests. Loyalties to self do not create conflicts of interests. The redes-
igned company uses self-interest to spawn entrepreneurial workers. 4 Per-
haps it was "unprecedented,"' 5 but it was predictable that Enron's Board
would approve the arrangement with Andrew Fastow despite the "clear
conflicts of interest" that the Subcommittee recognized. 6
Enron is not the best evidence for these arguments. At Enron, looting,
bribery, egotism, and other dramas of greed appear to such an extent that
Enron may be a distinctive organization. Yet, for an armchair professor, it
is an appealing example because others have done so much research. This
Article will avoid discussing the skullduggery that has attracted so much
attention. Instead of examining the manipulation of the organization that
makes Enron such a dramatic example, this Article addresses how the re-
design of corporations challenges corporate governance, even when it is
not manipulated by evil-doers."
The Subcommittee described Enron as a company that redesigned itself
to become "a high tech total global enterprise that traded energy contracts
like commodities, launched into new industries like broadband communi-
cations, and oversaw a multi-billion-dollar investment portfolio."' 8 The
Subcommittee labels the change at Enron "a transition."' 9 Its report does
not address the organizational redesign that accompanied this transition.
Its report also ignores that Enron was a corporate model. Enron was the
energy industry innovator. Enron's organization was understood as an
13 Like its guest workers, Enron's employees "labored under tremendous pressure to take signifi-
cant risks .... Enron's whiz kid recruits entered a perpetual tournament," which they called "rank or
yank." William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TULANE L. REV. 1275,
1292-93 (2002); see also BODILY & BRUNER, supra note 8, at 48. But see id. at 49 (discussing team
structure).
14"[T]he iron fist of intensification and job insecurity is softened as well as strengthened by the
velvet rhetoric of 'self-actualization' and the opportunity to work for 'meaning as well as money'...
cement[ed] together ... [by] the ideology of entrepreneurialism." David Knights & Hugh Willmott,
The Reengineering Revolution? An Introduction, in THE REENGINEERJNG REVOLUTION? CRITICAL
STUDIES OF CORPORATE CHANGE I, 7 (David Knights & Hugh Willmott eds., 2000); cf Katherine
V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing
Workplace, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 721 (2002); Katherine V. W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract:
Implications of the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 519
(2001).
Is ENRON'S COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 6.
16 d. at 24.
17 It has been argued that Enron is not the best evidence because "Enron's governance structure
was sui generis. " John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57
Bus. LAw. 1403, 1403 (2002). Enron's governance structure is the governance structure of the redes-
igned company. See, e.g.. id. at 1404. What may be sui generis about Enron is its drama of human
frailties.
18 ENRON'S COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 6.
19 Id.
ideal idea generating structure. 20 To analyze Enron is to analyze the now
dominant corporate organizational strategies.
Adopting an organizational focus, as does this Article, expands con-
cern. An organizational focus can help answer the regulatory question of
"Why didn't we catch them sooner?" It also can help answer the question
of "How did they get away with it?" In so doing, it can help explain how
corporations are governed.
Corporate law contains an organizational focus. It focuses on a chain
of command. Its corporation is a bureaucracy. Corporate law is concerned
with Generals and leaves it to the Generals to command the troops. Corpo-
rate law's focus does not capture the governance structures of innovative
corporations. Corporate redesign attacked bureaucracies for stifling inno-
vation. Redesigned corporations flatten hierarchy.2 Rather than directing
the troops, redesigned corporations energize the zeal of the troops. In such
corporations, Generals will find hierarchical commands insufficient to
govern their troops.
In the redesigned corporation, management and the board do not re-
view, let alone direct, the substance of most transactions. They review
risk-management reports on the transactions. Good governance means
getting the right information to the actors charged with decision-making.
That did not happen at Enron. Good governance also means creating
mechanisms of accountability. In redesigned corporations, risk manage-
ment is the key internal control mechanism. At Enron, risk management
neither provided accurate information nor ensured accountability.
To explain Enron as an example of the governance problems of redes-
igned corporations, Part I briefly summarizes the intra-corporate govern-
ance process in the redesigned corporation. Part II examines Enron as a
redesigned corporation. Part III discusses the risk management process at
Enron, drawing particularly on the process in which Enron's Board ap-
proved the Special Purpose Entities ("SPEs") of the off-the-books transac-
tions that are the focus of the Senate Subcommittee and Powers Reports.
Part IV discusses the Enron Board's approval of the Fastow conflicts of
interest in terms of the redesigned corporation's understanding of conflicts.
20 With hindsight, it is difficult to imagine how a Board member could have told Fastow "that En-
ron ought to get 'a patent' on the Raptor structures to sell them to other companies." Id. at 21. But, at
that time, it was reasonable for a Board member to believe that other companies would imitate the
Raptors, as they had so many other of Enron's innovations.
21 At Enron, there was a maximum four-level chain of command. BODILY & BRUNER, supra note
8, at 26.
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I. ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE REDESIGNED CORPORATION
22
Managers cannot bring out the intelligence of everyone
in the organization if they pretend they can do better thinking
in a few hours than a project team that has wrestled with the
problem for months. Instead of issuing arbitrary orders, they
need to raise concerns and trust the project team to find a way
of handling them that integrates with all the other issues guid-
ing the design.23
Redesigned corporations are among us. "Throughout much of the
economy, and especially among new firms, hierarchies are flatter, head-
quarters staff smaller ... [and employees experience] more fluid job defi-
nitions, and more ambiguous reporting relationships. '2 An objective of
redesign is to free innovation from the constraints of hierarchical control.2"
Redesigned organizations lack "the rules of clarity and commitment" of
"bureaucratic organizations."
26
There is a worldwide cultural and political movement attacking bu-
reaucracy. 27 In the public sector, governments are privatizing and disman-
tling bureaucracies. Corporate groups and networks are utilizing markets
instead of hierarchies. Within corporations, headquarters' staffs and
"middle-management" are downsized. In redesigned corporations, instead
of bureaucrats, employees are innovators.
Proponents of redesign disparage specialization, the self-sufficiency of
technical competence, uniform policies as well as standardized proce-
22 This section derives from Robert Eli Rosen, "We're All Consultants Now": How Change in
Client Organizational Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of Corporate Legal Services,
44 ARIZ. L. REV. 637 (2002). In that Article, I provided a description of the organizational strategies
from which this governance structure emerges. At any company the effects of organizational design
will depend on the organization's "unique history, power players, and power games." Denis Collins, A
Socio-Political Theory of Workplace Democracy: Class Conflict. Constituent Reactions and Organiza-
tional Outcomes at a Gainsharing Facility, 6 ORG. SCI. 628, 641 (1995). Nonetheless, like organiza-
tional and management studies, this Article generalizes.
23 GIFFORD PINCHOT & ELIZABETH PINCHOT, THE END OF BUREAUCRACY AND THE RISE OF THE
INTELLIGENT ORGANIZATION 34 (1994).
24 Paul DiMaggio, Introduction: Making Sense of the Contemporary Firm and Prefiguring Its Fu-
ture, in THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FIRM: CHANGING ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3, 26 (Paul DiMaggio ed., 2001) [hereinafter TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY FIRM].
25 The redesigned organization is premised on an inverse relation between risk-taking, innovative
behavior and formal conflict resolution, coordination procedures. Henry W. Chesbrough & David J.
Teece, Organizing for Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 66; see also GERALD A.
KRAINES, ACCOUNTABILITY LEADERSHIP: HOW TO STRENGTHEN PRODUCTIVITY THROUGH SOUND
MANAGERIAL PRACTICES (2001).2 6 DiMaggio, supra note 24, at 5.
27 This larger movement might be named the "Critique of Bureaucracy Movement." Robert Eli
Rosen, Breaking Through Bureaucracy and Democratic Participation (Apr. 1993) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
dures.2" They also target a hierarchical accountability structure, where
"coordination" is "done from a level or more above the work being coordi-
nated."'29 Employees had to be downsized (i.e., fired), we are told, so that
the remaining employees would become "empowered." 30
Corporations are redesigned to better realize "the obligation of an em-
ployee to deliver all elements of the value that he or she is being compen-
sated for delivering."'" Corporate redesign accepts that agents will engage
in opportunistic behaviors. Unlike bureaucracies, redesign does not reduce
agency costs by supervision. In redesigned corporations, agent opportun-
ism is managed indirectly and covertly.
First, incentive structures are established to align employee and corpo-
rate interests. Employees learn the operating rule of redesigned corpora-
tions: "You will be employed by us as long as you add value to the organi-
zation, and you are continuously responsible for finding ways to add
value."3 2 Management by objectives is one strategy for this control: Man-
agement supplies numbers to hit and compensation is based on hitting
these numbers.33 Such forms of hierarchical control are indirect mecha-
28 Before redesign, companies affirmed the "bureaucratic 'art of separation."' The bureaucratic
divisions of office and hierarchy enable role-differentiation: This is my office in this place in the hier-
archy. Paul du Gay, Making Up Managers: Enterprise and the Ethos of Bureaucracy, in THE POLITICS
OF MANAGEMENT KNOWLEDGE 19, 31 (Stewart R. Clegg & Gill Palmer eds., 1996). After redesign,
roles lack clarity and are subject to reinvention, so that it will be difficult to understand where decisions
were made.
29 PINCHOT & PINCHOT, supra note 23, at 23. "[T]he traditional hands-on role of the senior man-
ager is disappearing. The message seems to be: Get the processes right, and the company will manage
itself." Thomas M. Hout & John C. Carter, Getting it Done: New Roles for Senior Executives, HARV.
BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 133 (criticizing this message because it ignores the need to manage
political conflicts); see also Kurt Eichenwald, Another Quality of the Corporate Titan: Ignorance at the
Top, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,2002, § 4, at 3.
30 The literature on redesign usually fails to distinguish between empowered workers and profes-
sionals. At least for this reason, empowerment is a deceptive concept. Empowered professionals are
by definition unprofessional, for empowerment is understood to be a process that separates workers
from any "distinctive personal [or professional] values." Knights & Willmott, supra note 14, at 12.
Redesign affords corporate superiors plausible deniability. See infra pgs. 23-24. When officers and
directors are sued or prosecuted, those in redesigned companies will argue: "We empowered the work-
ers. We treated them like adults. We dismantled the bureaucracy in good faith in pursuit of innovation.
And the workers betrayed us."
31 KRAINES, supra note 25, at 15; see also Raymond E. Miles & W.E. Douglas Creed, Organiza-
tional Forms and Managerial Philosophies: A Descriptive and Analytical Review, 17 RES. IN ORGAN-
IZATIONAL BEHAV. 333, 362 (1995) (noting that all team members are expected to have "responsibili-
ties with bottom-line implications." To meet these, "they become partners in designing their own roles
and ex anding the nature of their contributions.").
W Walter W. Powell, The Capitalist Firm in the Twenty-First Century: Emerging Patterns in
Western Enterprise, in TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FIRM, supra note 24, at 57; cf supra note 13 (discuss-
ing Enron).
For a discussion of current scandals resulting from an emphasis on hitting the numbers, see Jo-
seph Fuller, A Letter to the Chief Executive, HARv. Bus. REv., Oct. 2002, at 64. For a discussion of
compensation based on the numbers hit, see JAMES O'SHEA & CHARLES MADIGAN, DANGEROUS
COMPANY: THE CONSULTING POWERHOUSES AND THE BUSINESSES THEY SAVE AND RUIN 296 (1997)
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nisms of control. For example, Enron's management may have set tar-
gets,34 but teams and employees initiate, plan, and implement projects to hit
the numbers.
Second, redesigned corporations utilize various motivational strategies.
For example, redesigned companies develop "fired up, highly cohesive"
teams.3' Rather than imposing hierarchical controls, redesigned corpora-
tions heavily rely on horizontal (e.g., peer) controls.36 In the redesigned
company, managers have a hands-off attitude toward teams.37  The "trans-
mission belt" delegation of powers from principal to agent is replaced3 by
one that emphasizes "network coordination. 39 Instead of transparent bu-
(providing the example of Andersen Consulting linking their fee to the number of jobs eliminated as a
result of its consultation). For a discussion of Enron, see Lynne L. Dallas, A Preliminary Inquiry Into
the Responsibility of Corporations and Their Directors and Officers for Corporate Climate: The Psy-
chology of Enron's Demise, ST. JOHN'S U. LAW REV. at nn.271, 274 (forthcoming), available at
http:///ssm.com/abstract id=35034 (last visited Feb. 22, 2003) (on file with the Connecticut Law Re-
view).
34 ENRON'S COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 22.
35Richard W. Woodman & William A. Pasmore, The Heart of It All: Group- and Team-Based
Interventions, in ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT: A DATA-DRIVEN APPROACH TO ORGANIZATIONAL
CHANGE 164, 166 (Janine Waclawski & Allan H. Church eds., 2002). "[T]eams... are typically...
collections of individuals whose working relationships require close coordination, higher levels of
cooperation, greater cohesiveness, and the like." Id. at 176 n.1; cf. David Hechler, Enron's legal staff
battered, confused, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 4, 2002, at Al (noting that two lawyers said "(t]here was a real
esprit de corps" and "[y]ou just walked into the lobby and you felt electrified"). Others describe the
esprit at Enron as highly individualistic. See Dallas, supra note 33, at nn. 277-83.
One risk of these fired-up, cohesive teams is that when team members assert their professional
ethics, they may be treated as engaging in "ethiscuity," the "taking of refuge in ethics in order to protect
oneself from potentially threatening and anxiety-producing relationships." GORDON LIPPITT &
RONALD LIPPiTT, THE CONSULTING PROCESS IN ACTION 74 (1978). At Enron, Lynne Dallas's argu-
ment is that a climate was created in which any commitment to ethics was inappropriate. Dallas, supra
note 33, at 6. Although an accurate description, the climate argument fails to capture intra-corporate
transactions. As a description, an organization's climate fails to recognize that in any corporation there
are multiple cultures and multiple mini-climates. The problem with deriving policy prescriptions from
describing climates is the assumption that particular acts create cultures or set climates. The relation-
ships between the cultures and practices of an organization are much more complex and intertwined
than Dallas presents. Agent reflexivity creates more than noise in the transmission of culture. The
relations of organization and culture are complex and need not be resolved for the analysis in this
Article.
36 With teams, "supervision, responsibility, and even discipline, is ... shifted from managers to
peers." Powell, supra note 32, at 58. In the redesigned company, "[e]mployee accountability shifts
from hierarchy to collegiality." Knights & Willmott, supra note 14, at 5.
37 For example, Enron's General Counsel James Derrick was praised by his legal staff for his
"honesty, intelligence and affability," but criticized for being "a hands-off manager" who "doesn't even
know the names of his lawyers." Hechler, supra note 35, at Al. What did he do instead of supervising
lawyers? Derrick was "involved" in Enron board decisions. Id.
38 Teams, for example, invent projects [ an executive function]. The teams also are responsible
for these projects' design and production [the legislative and administrative functions].
39This term has many meanings. It is used here to focus on the use of horizontal controls. For
example, in the redesigned corporation, professionals, inside or outside the corporation, often become
members of teams. They primarily report to the team. This splinters professional control. In response,
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reaucratic controls, redesigned companies employ covert motivational con-
trols.
Business transactions in redesigned companies are not managed hierar-
chically, but typically by self-managing project teams.4° Standardized pro-
cedures and policies are replaced by a commitment to aligning incentives.
Coordination by the hierarchy is constrained by a commitment to the teams
being self-managing.4
Hierarchical supervision of the projects that are developed is conducted
through reviews of risk-management reports, which project originators
write, at least in part. In redesigned companies, teams develop "[r]isk
management plans . . . to deal with unresolved issues and project risks,
negotiate their allocation and sharing, and create ways to deal with them so
as to mitigate the impact or eliminate the risks completely."42 Senior ex-
ecutives decide on whether or not to go forward with the project by assess-
ing these risk management plans, sometimes requiring that independent
assessments be made.43
In sum, in the redesigned corporation, markets are created within firms
some legal departments charged teams hiring outside counsel "an inspection fee to make sure the out-
siders didn't succumb to excess client pleasing." PINCHOT & PINCHOT, supra note 29, at 190. Manag-
ers were quick to portray the overhead "as a tariff to encourage continued use of inside resources when-
ever the decision was a close one." Id. In redesigned corporations, teams capture the "innovative"
potential of excess client pleasing.
40 Rosen, supra note 22, at 645. The combination of the downsizing and team strategies
produced resistance by workers to self-managing teams, who initially saw them as a means for further
layoffs. Debra L. Shapiro & Bradely L. Kirkman, Employees' Reaction to the Change to Work Teams:
The Inluence of 'Anticipatory' Injustice, 12 J. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE MGMT. 51 (1999).
Thomas A Stewart, Planning a Career in a World Without Managers, FORTUNE, Mar. 20,
1995, at 72. "Under conditions of fear-based hierarchical authority, risky behavior... is discouraged.
Teams, by contrast, provide safety from the power structure to take risks and do new things." PINCHOT
& PINCHOT, supra note 29, at 198. "The project workplan shows key activities involved in completing
the project, the subteam owning each activity and individual members responsible, deliverables of each
subteam, time lines associated with each activity, and estimated costs in performing each activity."
JOHN E. TRIANTIS, CREATING SUCCESSFUL ACQUISITION AND JOINT VENTURE PROJECTS: A PROCESS
AND TEAM APPROACH 133 (1999) (emphasis added). In one form of redesign, "the self-managing team
takes on personnel selection, discipline, and compensation." Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domi-
nation in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM.
L. REv. 753, 891 (1994) ("[A]s well as budgeting, purchasing, and customer-relations tasks"). But
others may leave some of these managerial functions to other actors. See, e.g., KRAINES, supra note
25, at 103 (decoupling determining individual compensation from team management). Kraines urges
companies to use teams to non-hierarchically monitor other teams. See generally id. at chs.7-8.
42 Triantis, supra note 41, at 137. "Risk management in acquisition projects takes several forms,
the most common being pushing the risk back to the seller or the target through the use of agreements,
negotiating the risk away to third parties, and allocating risk according to ability to handle. Other
approaches to risk management include purchasing commercial insurance to cover certain risks and
sharing the risk with the seller or other entities according to potential benefits received." Id. at 138; see
also id. at 267-80.
43 Id. at 148-49.
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and competition occurs through risk management reports." In many re-
spects, redesigned firms are combinations of intrapreneurial teams. A so-
ciologically accurate, but legally metaphorical, image of the redesigned
corporation is that of a holding company of intrapreneurial teams (meta-
phorically, dominated subs). The incentive structure is manipulated so that
to each team, their project is a bet-your-company deal.
Of course, corporate redesign may be a passing fad. Scandals may re-
sult in redesigned organizations becoming "more centralized." 5 The mar-
ket might induce companies to reinvigorate bureaucratic "command and
control" systems. Professional firms may learn the costs of letting their
project managers and their client relations partners overrule home office
judgments.' But, as Enron reveals, today organizational redesign is a sig-
nificant fact.
Bureaucratic corporate management not only governs agency costs, but
also responds to regulatory threats. Bureaucratic organization generates
seemingly trustworthy companies, capable of rational and accountable de-
cision-making, minimizing the need for intrusive regulatory policies.47
Today, our challenge is to make corporations without bureaucracy worthy
of public trust.
II. ENRON
Enron is a good case through which to explore the accountability struc-
tures of redesigned corporations. Before its fall, Enron was known as an
exemplary redesigned corporation."' Before its fall, Enron was lauded for
its sophisticated financial risk management tools.49 Before its fall, Enron
44 As is well known, corporate actors do not maximize, they satisfice. For the same reasons that
there are incomplete contracts, corporate actors can only satisfice. For example, the impossibility of
any corporate actor completely discovering all relevant information means that maximizing solutions
may not be found, even by the most loyal agent.
To reduce the gap between satisficing and maximizing, corporate redesign attacked the control
structure of the corporation. Executive control was delegated to self-managing project teams. Of
course, project teams also can only satisfice. But by teams continuously generating options, and execu-
tives judging options by their contribution to the goal of increasing shareholder returns, corporate
redesin supposedly narrows the gap between satisficing and maximizing.
4 This is "the most drastic change" of Paul Volcker's report on Arthur Andersen. Floyd Norris,
Andersen Told to Split Audits and Consulting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2002, at C1.
46 As they did at Andersen. See, e.g., POWERS REPORT, supra note 9, at 120 n.57. For a discus-
sion of client relations partners, see Rosen, supra note 22, at 672-75.
47 Michael Power, Auditing and the Politics of Control in the UK Financial Services Sector, in
CORPORATE CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 1, at 188-89.
48See W. Chan Kim & Renee Mauborgne, Strategy. Value Innovation and the Knowledge Econ-
omy, 40 SLOAN MGMT. REV. 41 (Mar. 22, 1999); Gary Hamel, Avoiding the Guillotine, FORTUNE, Apr.
2, 2001, at 139.
49 New Dynamics of Strategy in the Knowledge Economy, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 11, 1999, at
6; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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was seen as a supply source for the best risk management experts and
processes." After Enron's fall, it was accused of using weak risk man-
agement processes.
With hindsight, we know Enron was not such an exemplary company.
Enron's commitment to innovation was so great that teams could commit
significant resources, yet not include experts needed for their implementa-
tion. Consider Enron Online. This project began bottom-up with a natural
gas trader. Although the project was not within his group's purview, be-
fore contacting management outside his group, his team invested $15 mil-
lion, exclusive of salaries, of Enron's money to the project. The Enron
Online team had employed 25 outside law firms and 380 Enron employees
before it was approved. As the project team leader said: "It never crossed
my mind that we had to go talk" to executives prior to finalizing the pro-
ject." When the Enron Online project was presented, Jeffrey Skilling and
Kenneth Lay, Enron's top managers, were "surprised. 52
Enron Online demonstrates that Enron was a corporation in which self-
managing teams initiate and design projects. Employee innovations are not
bureaucratically directed. Professionals are not retained by management
and their work is managed by a bottom-up process.
One problem in redesigned corporations is how, in the absence of hier-
archical control, one team can capture the necessary resources from other
groups, many of whom may have over-filled plates, perhaps as a result of
their downsizing. This appears to have been a problem at Enron. When
the Enron Online project was approved, it was turned back to the project
team for implementation. But the project team did not obtain the coopera-
tion of other Enron operations groups who were necessary for its success.
Enron Online required "such services as settlements of deals, credit, risk
management, back-office paper-handling, etc."53 But when the project was
launched, these operations were not in place. As a result, Enron Online
both overcharged and undercharged its clients.54 Other project teams also
proceeded to implementation without being sufficiently integrated with
other corporate operations.55
50 James Brian Quinn, Outsourcing Innovation: The New Engine of Growth, 41 SLOAN MGMT.
REV. 13 (June 22, 2000).
51 Maxon, supra note 11, at IH ("We were off. 'This is a great idea and we're going to do it.'
There was no way anybody was going to say it wasn't a great business idea. It was.").
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Miles Moffeit, Enron Mishandled Billing, Overcharged Clients, Former Employees Say,
KNIGHT RIDDER WASH. BUREAU, Feb. 16,2002.
55Id. (noting that the growth of Enron Energy Services "far outpaced the company's information
management infrastructure[,]" and that "Enron's computer system was ... scattered and poorly man-
aged"); see also Kathy Thacker, Project Teams Laboring at Warp Speed Oflen Hit the Wall, Author
Says, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, May 14,2002, at 3D.
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Another problem at Enron appears to be how it managed risks in the
implementation of its projects. With hindsight, it now appears that "Enron
always bragged that it was state of the art in risk management, but here's a
company that didn't really do its risk-management homework."56 Deals
were approved that had "poor profit and loss projections," resulting in "un-
profitable contracts."" Because of risk management failures, Enron appar-
ently made bad business deals.
Examining Enron produces conflicting stories. The whole industry
was using off-the-books vehicles 8 and Enron's were the most sophisti-
cated. Enron could innovate in capital management because it combined
its sophistication with that of the leading law and accounting firms in that
field." On the other hand, Enron was an uncontrolled mess where high-
flyers cared nothing for the consequences of the transactions that yielded
them bonuses. At Enron, projects emerged that were implemented without
basic operational controls. Risk management was Enron's claim to fame,
as well as its weakest link. In Part Il.B of this Article, these conflicting
stories are enacted when Enron's Board approves the SPEs that were the
proximate cause of its bankruptcy, the Raptor Project.
III. RISK MANAGEMENTw
A. Law and Accounting as Profit Centers
Traditionally, corporate funds expended for legal and auditing services
were seen as losses, payments for side-constraints on the corporate mis-
sion. Today, tax departments, accounting firms, corporate legal depart-
ments, and law firms claim they are profit centers. They "add value" to the
corporation." One, in fact, could argue that it was through the financedepartment that Enron principally added value. Enron's transition was
56 Moffeit, supra note 54.
5 7 d.
58 Throughout the energy industry in the 90s, there was "a movement toward the increased use of
off-balance sheet structures." Rachel Sanderson, Energy Finance Polls 2000, PETROLEUM ECONO-
MIST, at 29 (Sept. 1, 2000); see also Catherine Lacoursiere, Hedging Strategies, 210 ELECTRICAL
WORLD 17 (Mar. 1996) ("From one perspective, independent power producers (IPPs) are burdened
with trying to raise capital on the basis of revenue that could slide way off base. Yet this burden may
turn into a boon for the market as a whole because IPP executives are being forced to rise to new levels
of creativity to survive. They now create financial hedges, forge strategic alliances, use portfolio ap-
proaches to finance projects ... IPPs are finding themselves at the crossroads where conventional and
non-conventional financing meet.").
59 See infra notes 65-68.
60 This Article describes one corporate decision. For a description of one class of decisions, see
Rosen, supra note 22, at 662, 671.
61 See Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: Constructing
the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 457, 466, 487 (2000); Rosen,
supra note 22, at 662,671.
from physically delivering natural gas products to offering financial prod-
ucts and then bundling physical delivery to the financial products.
The Subcommittee found that high risks were assumed because of "En-
ron's ordering its tax department to produce billions of dollars in company
earnings through the use of complex tax shelters." 2 More accurately, En-
ron's tax department developed and bought, from accounting and law
firms, products to increase company earnings. In redesigned companies,
tax departments will seek innovations to add value (produce earnings) to
the company.63 The problem is not that they do so, but that these innova-
tions may not be adequately assessed. The problem is not that "Enron was
using accounting practices that 'push limits' and were 'at the edge' of ac-
ceptable practices" and "approved an unprecedented arrangement."6 That
is called innovation. The problem is that the risks of these innovations to
Enron were not properly addressed.
Enron's financial team was composed of the firms that sold themselves
as leaders (and innovators) in the use of derivatives and other complex
financial solutions to corporate problems. Vinson & Elkins marketed
themselves as "in the forefront of ... capital markets, project finance and
structured finance solutions for ... energy initiatives." '6 Arthur Andersen
also emphasized its technical expertise, innovative approach and commit-
ment "to help the client emphasize the best strategies" to succeed in the
energy and utilities market." In particular, Arthur Andersen's energy and
utilities group praised Enron for "rethinking business models" and for de-
veloping a "value dynamics" model for "the valuation of a company's as-
sets.'6? Enron was the "leading edge."6
Beyond the self-dealing, a lesson of Enron are the dilemmas of moni-
toring risks when finance and law are seen as profit centers. In the redes-
igned company, such monitoring is especially difficult because profession-
als work on and for teams. As an outside lawyer put it, "We were giving
advice to the people we were instructed to give it to under their protocol"
and they were aware of the risks.69 The lawyers were there to help teams
62 ENRON'S COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 11.
63 Robert Eli Rosen, As the Big 5 Become Multi-Disciplinary Practices. Opportunities Abound
For Tax Executives, TAx EXECUTIVE, at 147 (Mar. 1, 1999).
64 ENRON'S COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 12.
65 Sanderson, supra note 58, at 29 (quoting Bruce Bilger, co-head of Vinson & Elkins' business
and international section).
66Id. (quoting Victor Burk, Andersen's managing partner of the energy and utilities industry
group ).
68 ENRON'S COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 20.
69 Ellen Joan Pollock, Limited Partners: Lawyers For Enron Faulted Its Deals. Didn't Force Is-
sue, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2002, at Al (quoting Vinson & Elkins' former managing partner Harry
Reasoner).
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develop projects so their exposures were reduced.7" For risk management
purposes, at least, teams treat lawyers like hired guns.7' They are there to
advance the project by mitigating, transferring, and hedging risks. As one
energy and utilities company senior executive said: "From a [transac-
tional] lawyer, what I want is quality of work: bringing up good issues and
pertinent points to defend our side of the equation.7 2
In the redesigned corporation, not all risks are eliminated. Projects will
be funded that have legal risks. Executives confront many risks and legal
risks are just one among many others. Legal non-compliance is a possibil-
ity. The corporate decision depends on the management of risks, not only
the removal of risks. For example, Arthur Andersen decided to retain En-
ron as a client because they believed, incorrectly in this case, that they "had
the appropriate people and processes in place to ... manage our engage-
ment risks."73 In work-outs due to risks eventuating, lawyers have an im-
portant but confidential role. Then, lawyers' work on risk management
"must be invisible" to those outside the corporation because the presence
of lawyers suggests that risks have not been eliminated, but just hedged,
transferred, or retained.74
Professionals in redesigned corporations add value by advancing pro-
jects that may realize benefits, while mitigating the projects' risks. Profes-
sionals also add value by using their expertise to develop projects that in-
crease corporate earnings. Law and auditing groups are profit centers.
Their projects, as well as the projects of the teams for whom they work, are
monitored by risk management reports. The next part of the Article, dis-
cussing SPEs, describes an instance in which a redesigned corporation did
not appropriately monitor its professionals.
B. The Raptor Project and Enron's Board
The Subcommittee found that:
Enron's high-risk accounting practices, for example, were not
hidden from the Board. The Board knew of them and took no
action to prevent Enron from using them. The Board was
briefed on the purpose and nature of the Whitewing, LJM,
and Raptor transactions, explicitly approved them, and re-
ceived updates on their operations. Enron's extensive off-
70 Id.
71 Cris Williams et al., Interfacing the Assessment, Management, and Communication of Risk, in
RISK-BASED ANALYSIS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGERS 90 (Kurt A. Frantzen ed., 2002) [hereinafter
RISK-BASED ANALYSIS].
72 Maxon, supra note I 1; see also sources cited in Dallas, supra note 33, at nn. 236, 242.
73 ENRON'S COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 19.
74 Samuel D. Ostrow, Risk Communication Basics, in RISK-BASED ANALYSIS, supra note 71, at
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the-books activity was not only well known to the Board, but
was made possible by Board resolutions."
The Board members interviewed by the Subcommittee replied that they
"had met their obligation to provide reasonable oversight of company op-
erations., 76 The Subcommittee finds instead that Enron's Board should
have investigated the transactions, overseen company operations, and hesi-
tated before approving "new business ventures and complex transac-
tions. 77 With hindsight, the Subcommittee was probably right. But, hind-
sight is twenty-twenty. More important, the Subcommittee's recommenda-
tions are so generic that a corporate board would be hard-pressed to know
where to begin. And if they did so, they would be reorganizing the corpo-
ration, undoing the benefits of redesign.
Corporate boards have a duty to "assur[e] themselves that information
and reporting systems exist in the organization that are reasonably designed
to provide.., timely, accurate information sufficient to allow management
and the board, each within its scope, to reach informed judgments. "" At
Enron, as at other redesigned companies, the principal assurance derived
from the company's use of "one-risk management system." 79
In the redesigned company, risk management groups govern critical
decisions.80 Risk management manages the borders between the corpora-
tion and its environment. In analyzing Enron, analyses have focused on its
interface with the regulatory environment. For financial firms, which En-
ron had become, this interface is critical and is normally assigned to its risk
managers. For example, the risk manager's report to the board of one fi-
nancial institution "is organized by the regulators' risk categories: credit,
compliance, operational, interest rate, liquidity, legal, reputational."'' In
response to Enron, she will "be adding strategic risk to the report. "82 Her
response recognizes that Enron demonstrated not only a legal compliance
failure, but also a business failure. To the business community, Enron's
failure is only partly that of inadequate legal and accounting gatekeepers.
More important, it demonstrates a business failure. The SPEs were bad
business deals. It is the business failure that an analysis of risk manage-
ment with respect to the SPEs especially demonstrates.
75ENRON'S COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 13.
76 Id. at 14.
77 Id.
78 In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959,970 (Del. Ch. 1996).
79 BODILY & BRUNER, supra note 8, at 26.
80 See Rosen, supra note 22, at 651-60 (exploring how redesigned companies view legal work as
part of the risk management process).
SI Ann Hengel, Effecting Sound Risk Management Practices, 10 RISK MGMT. J. 62 (July 1, 2002).
82 Id.
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Risk management was crucial to Enron not only because of its regula-
tory environment, but also because of its business plan. In response to
price and supply volatility risks in the energy industry, Enron placed long-
term fixed commitments which needed to be hedged. At least, in response
to the expected emergence of competition, which would increase the likeli-
hood of non-performance of these commitments, Enron's strategy was to
increase its purchases in the highly leveraged energy and financial product
markets. This increased Enron's debt-to-equity ratio, 3 thereby increasing
Enron's financial exposure. In addition, Enron attempted to diversify its
products lines. To realize these growth opportunities, Enron required sig-
nificant internal financing. Enron's Risk Assessment and Control Group's
principal task was to manage Enron's market risk exposures.8 4
The Subcommittee found that:
Andersen regularly informed the Audit Committee that Enron
was using accounting practices that, due to their novel design,
application in areas without established precedent, or signifi-
cant reliance on subjective judgments by management per-
sonnel, invited scrutiny and presented a high degree of risk of
non-compliance with generally accepted accounting princi-
ples. 5
Replace "accounting" with "business," and this is a description of innova-
tive business strategy.
Andersen's presentations to the Board, like other project presentations,
normally consisted of "a risk profile analysis."" Andersen rated these risks
and some of the risks were "rated as high risk."8" The Subcommittee de-
cries Enron for taking these high risks.88
Andersen's presentation differed only in substance from the other risk
profiles that the Board received from project teams. Finance, like other
profit centers, suggested projects that were risky. It is with hindsight, and a
83 From 1997-2000, the Debt-to-Equity Ratio increased by 230%. Richard D. Phillips, Enron:
The Risk Management Lessons, at 4, at www.cermas.gsu.edu/eventsLrownbagO32102/phillips.pdf, at 4
(Mar. 21, 2002) (last visited Feb. 22, 2003) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
84 "Market risks are monitored by an independent risk control group operating separately from
the units that create or actively manage these risk exposures to ensure compliance with Enron's stated
risk management policies." ENRON CORP., 2000 ANN. REP. 27 (Financial Risk Mgmt.) (emphasis
added), at www.enron.com/corp/investors/annuals/2000/ar2000.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2003) (on file
with the Connecticut Law Review).
85 ENRON'S COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 15.
6 Id. at 16.
87 Id.
88 See id. At many points in the report, Enron's Board is lambasted for approving "high risk"
strategies. See, e.g., id. at 20, 24. I write this Article as a war with Iraq is being debated. I don't hear
the Senate lambasting the President for advocating high risk strategies.
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focus on legal risks segregated from all the other risks that Enron faced,
that permits the Subcommittee to rely on the presence of high accounting
risks to discover intentional breaches of the Board's duty of care. The
Subcommittee approves the idea that "high risk activities by the company's
outside auditor 'is a giant red flag."'' 9 Replace "outside auditors" with
"project teams" and red flags would be flying all over the place at redes-
igned companies.
The redesigned corporation accepts the adage, "no risks, no gain". A
simplifying, but accurate description of innovation is that it is "intelligent
gambling." 90 Gambling is intelligent if a corporation has in place processes
and people to manage risks. Andersen told the Board, "[tihe Company's
personnel are very sophisticated and enter into numerous complex transac-
tions ... "' Andersen told the Board that Enron had employees who were
capable of intelligent gambling.
In the redesigned company, risk management decisions are the execu-
tive decisions. Consider the Board decisions with respect to the SPEs. The
presentations of the SPE transactions to the Board concluded with their risk
management profiles. The minutes of the meeting of Enron's Finance
Committee that approved the SPE "Talon," developed by the Project Rap-
tor team, are publicly available, 92 so Project Raptor will be used to illus-
trate this point.
The Talon presentation was made by Ben Glisan, who was promoted to
be the presumptive Enron Corporate Treasurer earlier in the meeting.9
The presentation discussed five slides. The first slide has the project name
and a description of this as a "Hedging Program.94 The second slide, titled
"Purpose," describes Raptor as a "risk management program.95 The Fi-
nance Committee was told that it was being presented another of the inno-
vations for which Enron had become so famous. 96
The next two slides describe Talon's structure. The first one, labeled
"Structural Highlights," has five bullets. Two are Talon's benefits to En-
ron. Talon was to be a hedge counterparty for Enron's investment losses
and yet allow Enron to receive gains from the hedging activities. 9' The




92 See Minutes, Meeting of the Finance Committee of the Board of Directors, Enron Corporation
(May 1, 2000) [hereinafter Finance Committee], at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron /fincom
050100min.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2003) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).93 d. at 2.
94 /d. at21.
95 Id. at 22.
96 See supra notes 49-50.
See Finance Committee, supra note 92, at 23.
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financial base and thereby a growing capacity to provide Enron P&L vola-
tility protection." The next slide is of the "Vehicle Structure." On the
available copy of the Minutes, on this slide, it is noted that Andersen's
"Mr. Causey joined the discussion and stated that Arthur Andersen LLP
had spent considerable time analyzing the Talon structure and the govern-
ance structure of LJM2 and was comfortable with the proposed transac-
tion.""
The presentation concluded with a discussion of "Project Raptor's risk
and potential mitigants to those risks."'" The risk management slide on
the Project included three risks and three mitigants.'0 l The first risk is
"Accounting scrutiny." Its mitigant is that the "[t]ransaction [was] re-
viewed by CAO [Chief Accounting Officer] and Arthur Andersen." This
statement is accurate. If the transactions do not stand up to accounting
scrutiny, this risk to Enron may be mitigated by its reliance on Arthur An-
dersen. Does this reliance eliminate the risk? No. But this reliance does
make Arthur Andersen an insurer, at least, of the moral aspects of the
risk."0 2 What this risk mitigant doesn't guard against is the risk that Arthur
Andersen will decide to shed risks.
And this risk eventuated. Arthur Andersen decided that it could no
longer insure the SPEs. Andersen decided that in this case "in for an inch"
didn't mean "in for the mile." Without Andersen's insurance, Enron pro-
duced a consolidated balance sheet that assumed responsibility for the note
receivable in Raptor. Representatives of Enron have evidence that they
complied with the law and obeyed when their accountants told them what
financial data needed to be published.0 3
Did the Board breach the duty of care by assuming the risk that Ander-
sen would not withdraw its support for the SPEs? o4 The SPEs were "vehi-
98 Id. Talon began with $200 million of creditworthiness. Talon's creditworthiness would in-
crease as Enron's stock price increased. Talon's creditworthiness also would increase as it UM2 grew.
UM2 would grow because it was offering investors 30 percent annualized rate of return plus fees from
its Talon investments. See id.
99Id.
Id. at 25.
101 Id. The legal risks of SEC violations are not on the risk management report, nor are public re-
lations risks should this project fail. Id.
102 In other words, Enron takes Andersen's reputation hostage. Enron used Andersen to ensure
Enron from condemnation for lacking accountability and moral commitments. Cf. Tom Baker, Risk,
Insurance, and the Social Construction of Responsibility, in EMBRACING RISK: THE CHANGING CUL-
TURE OF INSURANCE AND RESPONSIBILITY 33 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002) ("[A] transfer
of risk is also a transfer of responsibility."). Of course, Andersen was not insuring Enron against loss in
the wa3 that a financial guarantee insures against specific dollar losses.
POWERS REPORT, supra note 9, at 126. Enron voluntarily unwound Raptor because the dilu-
tion of Enron stock became too great.
104Even if they did, in Delaware, "the risk of significant out-of-pocket damage liability for an af-
firmative decision made in good faith is extremely low." Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of
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ties" to reach certain goals, the vehicles reached their goal because of their
"structure." '' Andersen had told the board it was "comfortable" with the
structure. 06
The second risk is "[s]ubstantial decline in the price of ENE stock."' 7
This risk creates two risks, that the "Program terminates early" and "in-
creases [in] credit risk."' ' The mitigant for both risks is "Negotiation of
early termination with LMJ2.'
To the extent that LJM2 is able and willing to maintain and increase its
investments in Talon, these risks are mitigated. The Board was told at this
meeting that LJM2 had $386 million of capital, of which $139 million had
already been invested in Enron."' More important, Enron's board had
some reason to believe that LJM2 would show loyalty to Enron because it
was managed by "Our Man Fastow." Is it a breach of the duty of care to
assume the risk that Fastow would be cooperative? Certainly not in Dela-
ware. " ' I
On Glisan's risk management slide, the third risk is "Counterparty
credit" and its mitigant is "Assets of vehicle subject to a master netting
agreement.""' 2 This statement is false. Netting does not protect Enron
from the risks of counterparty credit, of its being able to collect its net
money position against Talon. Netting protects Enron from Talon "cherry
picking" among its investments during Talon's bankruptcy. Netting ar-
rangements do not prevent Talon from becoming bankrupt, nor do they
protect the net revenues due Enron from Talon." 3
Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountabil-
ity, 89 GEO. L. J. 797, 819(2001).
105 Finance Committee, supra note 92, at 24.
1o6 Id. at 23.
107 Id. at 25.
108 Id.
Ito M. at 20.
II If it is not a breach of the duty of care for a board to retain and shower with bonuses an officer
against whom there is evidence that demands at least a probable cause hearing for sexual harassment, it
cannot be a breach of the duty of care to rely on an unblemished officer, although it was a drastic mis-
take. See White v. Panic, 793 A.2d 356 (Del. Ch. 2000).
112/d. at 25.
13 As my colleague Willam Widen taught me:
Netting arrangements address "what is known in the industry as 'cherry picking'
and it was a widespread problem that was one of the first addressed by ISDA when
lobbying for changes in the bankruptcy code. Anyone conversant with swaps knew
about the problem. It simply is this. Suppose that I have I I swap transactions with
a single counterparty - assume the counterparty is Raptor. Make them all interest
swaps. In 6 I am a floating rate payor. In 5 1 am a fixed rate payor.
Now, the interest rate environment is such that the 6 transactions in which I am a
floating rate payor all are in the money to me. The five in which I am a fixed rate
payor are out of the money. Suppose Raptor files for bankruptcy. Raptor would re-
ject all 6 of the transactions in which I am a floating rate payor since Raptor is los-
ing money on all of those. Raptor would accept all 5 of the transactions in which I
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It was the lack of creditworthiness of the Raptor Project's SPEs that
forced Arthur Andersen to withdraw its endorsement. This resulted in En-
ron's restatement of its financial reports, showing significant charges
against earnings and reductions in shareholder equity. This "triggered En-
ron's credit rating downgrades and its eventual bankruptcy."' '
4
Because of the creditworthiness risk, this was a bad business deal.
Even had they not been the product of legal and accounting evasions, and
even if Enron was not covering the SPEs losses, "the Raptor SPEs had a
structural defect." ' 15
The Finance Committee approved Talon on the basis of an inaccurate
and deceptive risk management report. That the Committee approved a
bad business deal on the basis of this risk management report raises impor-
tant questions not unique to this transaction.
First, it asks whether the Board had the capacity to know when it was
not making informed decisions on risk management reports. Professor
William H. Widen concludes that corporate problems are "enhanced when
board members in a complex industry are generalists without any connec-
tion to the details of particular lines of business.""' 6 He notes that:
Even though Enron was running a derivatives business, it
seems that those on the Finance Committee and, more gener-
ally on the Board, did not have a sufficient derivatives back-
ground to understand and evaluate what they were being told
in the presentation. If they had this background, the identi-
fied risk mitigants would not have been accepted.'7
The Raptors were bad business deals. "Why did no one understand
this on the Enron Board?"'s Of course, members of the Board might have
am a fixed rate payor as Raptor is making money on them. This illustrates cherry
picking. The simple fix to the bankruptcy code was to permit netting of the collec-
tive positions so that, at worst, Raptor rejects a single contract. Various scenarios
are possible along the above lines.
It [netting] simply allows a reduction in credit exposure by preventing disagrega-
tion of net credit exposure. Note what netting does not do - it does nothing to pro-
tect my net in the money position against Raptor. Yet, a huge net in the money posi-
tion is exactly what was reported in footnote 16 in Enron's 10-K. ( ... footnote 16
to the annual financial statements ... indicated a net in the money position held by
Enron against the Raptors for $500 million).
Memorandum from William H. Widen to Robert Eli Rosen (Jan. 20, 2003) (on file with author) [here-
inafter Widen Memo].
114 ENRON's COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 42.
11 Id. at 41.




understood and are just pleading ignorance." 9 The courts will decide this.
Regardless of what the courts find, the policy prescription remains. The
Board must have the capacity to analyze risk management reports in order
to avoid the question of "Where was the Board?"
The Board's bad business decision raises a more basic question. Why
was a deceptive risk management report presented to them? Had an ade-
quate report been presented, the Board might only have approved a vehicle
in which sufficient outside capitalization was committed before swaps took
place.'20 If this had been done, the SPEs, at least formally, would have had
sufficient credit quality. More important, it would have been a good busi-
ness deal.
One answer for the deceptive risk management slide may be collusion.
The pseudo-mitigant of master netting might have been a deliberate eva-
sion to get the assent of an unsophisticated board, rather than a mistake by
the risk management assessment team. This is not difficult to imagine as
Glisan, the presumptive Enron treasurer, who made the presentation, also
was head of the Enron Corporation's business unit, from which the project
emerged, and was designated as Enron's negotiator with LJM.' 2' Collusion
is also possible because the risk managers may have feared retaliation
should they have refused to approve the deals. 22
The SPE deals were signed off on by a variety of individuals, including
Rick Buy, the Chief Risk Officer. 2a Since the problem with Talon was
that its credit risks were not appropriately managed, Buy's signature raises
the question, "Where were the risk managers?" As Buy admits, "he
viewed his role as being primarily to evaluate Enron's [credit] risk.' 124
Yet, the Powers Report seems to give a pass to Buy, concluding that Buy
had not "ignored his responsibilities."' 25 Buy is not charged with derelic-
tion of duty.
119 The Subcommittee's report finds knowledge of the deceptive accounting, hence the Finance
Committee had intent to deceive, at least to the extent that no reasonable person would have left this
presentation without knowing that it was a scam. See ENRON'S COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 45-48, 5 1.
120 UM2 was described to the Board as "an alternative, optional source of private equity." Min-
utes, Meeting of the Board of Directors of Enron Corporation, at 17 (Oct. 11-12, 1999), at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/bd01 I 1299min.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2003) (on file with
the Connecticut Law Review). The motion approving the Raptor Project described UM2 as "a poten-
tial ready purchaser of the Company's businesses and assets." Id. at 18.
121 _JM2 Approval Sheet, Enron Corp., at 11-12 (June 30, 2000) [hereinafter UM2 Approval
Sheet], at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enronljmapprvO63000.pdf (last visited Feb. 22, 2003)
(on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
122 Dallas, supra note 33 at n.255. But see supra note 84.
123 UM2 Approval Sheet, supra note 121, at 11-12. Mr. Buy heads the Company's Risk As-
sessment & Control Group ("RAC Group"). Minutes, supra note 120, at 3.
124 POWERS REPORT, supra note 9, at 168.
125 Id.
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Professor Coffee speculates that the pace of developments at Enron
"outdistanced the development of risk management systems."' 26 The Pow-
ers Report offers a different interpretation. The Powers Report argues that
the risk management failure at Enron resulted from Buy's role being "more
narrow than the Board had reason to believe, and Buy did not act affirma-
tively to carry out (or ensure that others carried out) a careful review of the
economic terms of all transactions between Enron and LJM."'
27
Rather than focusing on the deceptive risk management report, the
Powers Report's mild condemnation of Enron's risk management group
seems to be based on a misunderstanding of risk management's role, which
is not to eliminate risks, but to manage them. Consider its discussion of
Enron's Research Group, which "handles sophisticated option pricing and
modeling issues" and was a sub-group of Enron's Risk Assessment and
Control Group. 2  The Powers Report emphasizes that the Research Group
recommended against one of the SPE transactions because "the structure
was unstable from a credit capacity standpoint because the SPE was capi-
talized with Enron stock."'129 Buy reported "that at some point his group
evaluated the credit capacity, found that it was too low, and recommended
changes in the structure that improved it."' 30 The Powers Report treats this
as conflicting evidence about whether Buy knew that the deal should have
been stopped and Buy's version that he mitigated some of the credit risks.
If the role of risk management is not to eliminate risks, but mitigate them,
then Buy might have properly responded to the Research Group's report.
When the Powers Report finds that Buy understood his role too nar-
rowly,' 3' it seems to demand an elimination of risk role. The Report more
profitably should have asked why the risk management report that emerged
didn't mitigate the credit risks.
A similar story unfolds when the Powers Report presents evidence on
RAC Research Group's employment by Enron's internal accounting staff.
The Research Group inalyzed the SPEs' structure "and determined there
was a 68% probability that the structure would default."'' 32 Like Buy, the
Chief Accounting Officer did not decide to abandon the project, thereby
126 Coffee, supra note 17, at 1404.
127 POWERS REPORT, supra note 9, at 22. The Powers Report blames Skilling with the risk man-
agement failure. M. at 20-21.
128 Id. at 84.
129 Id. at 85. It also is reported that Buy was told that "the payout was skewed against Enron" by
the head of the option pricing and modeling group. Id. at 84. The import of this evidence is little
different from the evidence discussed in the text.
230 Id. at 84.
131 Id. at 22.
132 /d. at 87.
eliminating the probable result, but thought about creating "a credit re-
serve" to mitigate it.'33
Both the Subcommittee and the Powers Reports do indirectly reveal a
significant problem in redesigned companies. Redesigned corporations
rely on risk management groups, but they don't always back up this reli-
ance. For example, with respect to the SPEs, Enron's Board believed that
"numerous groups monitor compliance with procedures and controls and
regularly update. . . Mr. Buy."' 34 Yet in all the meetings of the Board and
its Committees whose minutes have been reviewed, Mr. Buy has a very
limited role, reporting on trading limits, commercial credit, and market
risks.'35 Although the SPEs were fraught with risks and the Board had
given Buy the responsibility to "review all transactions between the Com-
pany and LJM funds,' 36 it was consistent with Enron's delegation to the
risk management group, its normal tasks, that Buy's group would interpret
its involvement with the SPEs as primarily one of verifying that "the sale
price was consistent with the acquisition price."' 37
The responsibilities redesigned corporations assign to risk management
often far exceed their tasks. Like legal departments in bureaucratic corpo-
rations, risk management is seen as a side-constraint. 3 Risk management
groups often are not included in significant transactions and their
recommendations are ignored. 39 Risk managers often have too much of a
sit-in-the-office-until-called strategy. Risk managers may not be on teams,
but rather take piecework from teams. Piecework does not provide
complete information to risk managers and assessment of risks
consequently may be distorted. 4
133Id. at 87.
134 Minutes, Meeting of the Audit and Compliance Committee of the Board of Directors, Enron
Corporation, at 3 (Feb. 12, 2001) (discussing UM), at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/aud
comp021201 min.pdf, at 3 (last visited Feb. 22, 2003) (on file with the Connecticut Law Review).
135 The Audit and Compliance Committee meeting that described Buy's important role ran out of
time before they heard Buy's "Credit and Market Risk Update." Id. at 5. In the meeting that approved
Talon, Buy made an extensive presentation on Enron's trading limits policy and the risks of Enron's
merchant, commodity, market and currency portfolios. Finance Committee, supra note 92, at 2-4. In
another meeting he discussed violations of the trading limit policy and "noted that the RAC group was
working with the business units to reduce the number of violations, and discussed the reasons for the
violations." Minutes, supra note 119, at 4 (emphasis added). At this meeting Mr. Buy's presentation
began with his discussion of "the Company's Top 25 [commercial] credit exposures." Id. at 3. In the
various meetings whose Minutes have been reviewed, Buy never demonstrates that his group had the
capaci to accomplish the tasks the Board expected of it in the SPE transactions.
136 POWERS REPORT, supra note 9, at 169.
137 Id. at 168.
138 See Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement: Professional Judgment and Organiza-
tional Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 481-86 (1989) (discussing legal departments).
139 POWERS REPORT, supra note 9, at 168.
140 The Risk Management Research Group was not told important facts about a transaction and
therefore produced an inaccurate analysis. See id. at 124-25; cf Robert Eli Rosen, Problem-Setting and
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To exemplify risk management's limited role at Enron, consider its
failures to establish adequate procedures for approving projects and ensur-
ing that all projects enter the approval process. 4' The Board required that
the SPE transaction could not proceed without a Deal Approval process.
Not only does the Powers report criticize Buy for not making sure that
these procedures were followed in all cases, but the Report also concludes
that the approval process "was not well-designed" and that the "LJM Deal
Approval Sheets were a formality that provided little control."' 42
The Approval Sheets did not require any documentation of
efforts to find third party, unrelated buyers for Enron assets
other than LJM 1 or LJM2 . . . Some of the questions ...
were framed with boilerplate conclusions ("Was this transac-
tion done strictly on an arm's-length basis?),'43 and others
were worded in a fashion that set unreasonably low standards
or were worded in the negative ("Was Enron advised by an
third party that this transaction was not fair, from a financial
perspective, to Enron?").'
These are the problems of a group that knows it lacks power within the
corporation. An important conclusion from the Enron case is that redes-
igned corporations need risk management teams that can accomplish their
assigned responsibilities. Furthermore, given current composition stan-
dards for risk-management reports, it is likely that they will not explain
their mitigation of risks in sufficient detail so as to allow significant re-
view. As a result, companies will make improvident decisions. Further-
more, given corporate law's lack of focus on the risk management process,
it is unlikely that decisions made on the basis of inadequate risk manage-
ment reports will breach officers' and directors' duties of care. Boards of
redesigned corporations must assure themselves that risk management sys-
tems produce reports that allow for informed and reasoned board decisions.
Two more subtle problems emerge from considering the Enron case.
First, there are moral hazard problems. Teams have incentives to shape
risk management reports so that their project will be selected. When bad
business deals result, officers and directors will say, "We were aware of
this moral hazard problem and responded to it, albeit inadequately as this
legal action demonstrates. But, we are able to respond to agency costs. If
not, the market will. No second-guessing is needed from outsiders. For
the current case, we have no liability because we didn't order it nor did we
Serving the Organizational Client: Legal Diagnosis and Professional Independence, 56 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 179, 201-02 (2001).
141 POWERS REPORT, supra note 9, at 22, 90.
142Id. at 170-171.
143 GAAP requires substantiation of this claim. See id. at 198-99.
144 See id. at 170.
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fail to respond to clear signals which were (not) present."
Officers and directors are unlikely to mention the moral hazard prob-
lem that emerges from their "empowerment" of workers. In a bottom-up
strategy, executives attain plausible deniability. "We treated them like
adults and they betrayed us." In shifting responsibility down the line, ex-
ecutives are all too likely to engage in risky behavior.
Consider a director's or officer's testimony that, "We knew there were
these very significant risks, but we did it anyway. It was a cost-benefit
weighing." This is music to a tort lawyer's ears. On the other hand, in a
corporation with a properly functioning risk management system, this is a
choice that officers and directors must make for the benefit of the share-
holders. For officers and directors, this creates a double-bind. The redes-
igned corporation, in allowing executives to attain plausible deniability
through self-managing employees, resolves this double-bind. 45 But, it
imposes agency costs on shareholders when the corporation is liable or
suffers financial losses from actions that were never directed, but worked
their way up from the bottom.
Second, as a result of corporate redesign, compliance officers have be-
come risk-managers. Compliance officers' zeal is re-shaped. A crucial
consequence is that noncompliance becomes an option. Risks are not al-
ways eliminated; they often are transformed, hedged, and insured.
This change in the understanding of corporate compliance is reflected
not only within the corporation, but also in multi-disciplinary auditing
firms. Post-Enron, the big news is that consulting partners exited from
their partnerships with auditors. This news fails to emphasize that compli-
ance consultants, and tax consultants, stayed with the auditors. That com-
pliance and tax consultants remained with the auditors reflects that these
consultants' added value derives in large part from their organizational link
with auditors."4 A tax product, for example, is easier to sell when your
partners are going to audit the books. Compliance decisions similarly in-
crease in value when your audit partner decides what needs to be reported.
As compliance decisions are understood as risk management decisions,
serious conflicts of interest emerge between the normative idea of auditors
and the reality of their business, in which compliance partners sell risky
compliance. Nonetheless, the SEC has not implemented Sarbanes-Oxley
145 Another way in which directors and officers attain plausible deniability is by relying on ex-
perts. Directors are entitled to reasonably rely on experts. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e)
(2002). When boards delegate decisions to experts, they fragment corporate governance. Corporate
redesign, by providing boards with other bases for plausible deniability, further fragments the govern-
ance of corporations from being centralized in the board.
146 The exiting consultants needed auditors mainly for solicitation. Having solicited the world,
Big 5 Management Information Systems ("MIS") consultants, among others, decided that the cross-
selling opportunities of partnerships with auditors were outweighed by the cross-compensation de-
mands and other risks of the partnership and decided to exit.
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in such a way as to require the tax and compliance partners to exit account-
ing firms.
IV. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
A troubling aspect of the Enron story is the Enron Board's decision to
waive its own policy and permit Fastow to be both Enron's CFO and the
manager of credit counter-party SPEs "[d]espite clear conflicts of inter-
est.'' 147 Reportedly, even in the Risk Assessment and Control Group there
was discomfort because of Fastow's conflict of interest.44 An Andersen
partner wrote: "Why would any director in his or her right mind ever ap-
prove such a scheme?"' 49
One might also ask how in its right mind could Andersen be both an
inside and an outside auditor? Yet, Andersen, and other Big 5 accounting
firms, sold this arrangement to companies, including Enron.5 One also
might ask how in its right mind could Vinson & Elkins review transactions
in which it had been engaged?' 5 '
This Part suggests an answer to these questions based on organiza-
tional redesign. Its argument is that redesigned organizations have a dif-
ferent basic understanding of conflicts of interest. Conflicts are understood
to emerge not from loyalties to self, but to other organizations.
In the redesigned corporation, self-interest creates dynamism, not a
conflict of interest. High-powered incentives supposedly align the individ-
ual with the company. Bonuses for successful projects often are exorbitant
in dollar terms, but are aligned with the gains to be realized. The redes-
igned company presumes conflicts between self and corporate interests.
The excessive compensation that Fastow received from the SPEs did
not concern the Board. Although Fastow took more, the Board was appar-
ently content that, from LJM 1, Fastow would receive a twenty-five percent
return on his invested capital and fifty percent of asset appreciations (ex-
cept for that in Enron stock).5 2 The conflict between Fastow's self-interest
147 ENRON'S COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 24.
148 POWERS REPORT, supra note 9, at 84-5.
149 See ENRON'S COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 25 (citing Andersen's Exhibit no. 763).
150 See id. at 57-58 (discussing Enron & Andersen).
151 Vinson & Elkins apparently saw no conflict in using its client relation partner for Enron as
one of the two investigators. POWERS REPORT, supra note 9, at 173. Even if this partner had not been
involved in designing the deal, he was involved in selling other V&E lawyers to Enron. For a discus-
sion of the emergence of client relationship partners in law firms, see Rosen, supra note 22, at 672-75;
Coffee, supra note 18, at 1411-12, 1415.
152 POWERS REPORT, supra note 9, at 69 n.24. Similarly, Enron's Board did not see a conflict of
interest being created by the Board compensating outside directors through "stock and option packages,
worth more than $80,000 in the year 2000." Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflec-
tions on the Corporation Law Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. L.J. 1371, 1378 n.24 (2002).
and Enron's interest was understood by the Board as a problem of public
relations, not substance.1
53
In the redesigned corporation, a conflict of interest is created by loyalty
to a company not within the corporation's porous borders. The managerial
conflict of interest problem, in the redesigned company, is to manipulate
the self-interest of its employees and guest workers so that they are
unlikely to act on their loyalties to other organizations, such as the SPEs,
Andersen, and Vinson & Elkins.
Enron's basic business strategy exemplifies this understanding of con-
flicts of interest. In its trading operations, for example, Enron's counter-
party "was simultaneously a customer, supplier, and competitor."'154 This
arrangement is made possible by assuming self-interest and manipulating it
by breaking down borders between companies. It was understood as suffi-
cient to avoid conflicts of interest to ensure that none of these parties com-
peted on trades with Enron.
With respect to transactions with the SPEs, as with respect to the work
of Andersen and Vinson & Elkins, Enron did not understand them as cross-
border transactions. The Board trusted its executives to make sure that
Enron's interests were advanced in transactions with such self-interested
organizations. For example, the Board was told that LJM1 was an "In-
vestment Management Company.'"" Enron's conflicts of interest solution,
not its conflicts problem, was to use Fastow's self interest as fund manager
and Enron stock holder to advance Enron's interests.
The Subcommittee criticized the Board because it "relied on Enron
management to develop and implement the day-to-day controls needed to
monitor LJM."' 56 It also criticized the Board for not taking swift action
when proper controls were over a year behind schedule.' In so doing, it
presumed a hierarchical method of control on which the redesigned organi-
zation does not primarily rely. It also presumes that the self interest of
LJM needed to be directly, not indirectly or covertly,'58 controlled.
Similarly, the Subcommittee does not understand the redesigned corpo-
ration's understanding of conflicts of interest when it finds that "No Board
member expressed any concern that Andersen [as external auditor] might
be auditing its own work [as internal auditors], or that Andersen auditors
might be reluctant to criticize Andersen consultants for the LJM or Raptor
structures that Andersen had been paid millions of dollars to help de-
The Subcommittee, on the other hand, did see this as generating conflicts. ENRON'S COLLAPSE, supra
note 2, at 56-57.
153 POWERS REPORT, supra note 9, at 151-52.
154BODILY & BRUNER, supra note 8, at 51.
155ENRON'S COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 26 n.63.
156Id. at 29.
I7 Id.
158 See supra Part 1.
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sign."'3 The Subcommittee does not take seriously the Board's under-
standing of why this created no conflict. It is incredulous that the Audit
Committee, at least, appears to have "taken great comfort in knowing that
Andersen was more than Enron's outside auditor, but also provided Enron
with extensive internal auditing and consulting services."'O6
The Subcommittee does not take seriously that allowing Andersen to
be within the company's borders "on a day-to-day basis ... was a signifi-
cant benefit to Enron"'' and a solution to the conflict of interest it found.
Putting a positive spin on it, Andersen's place on the innovating project
teams gave assurances that accounting (tax and compliance) risks were
noticed and managed early. Less positively, bringing Andersen within
Enron's borders allowed Enron to manipulate Andersen professionals to
favor their own interests and Enron's interests. Making Andersen employ-
ees Enron guest workers "help[ed] the company design its most complex
structures from the start."'
162
For those structures that failed, Andersen employees' independence
from Enron might have been a preferable alternative. But for those struc-
tures whose innovations did indeed add value to Enron, bringing Andersen
employees within the company may have advanced the freedom and ener-
gized the zeal on which redesigned companies rely.
As a normative matter, the Subcommittee may be right that Enron
should never have approved the conflicts of interest that it did. As a prac-
tical matter, the conflicts the Subcommittee reviewed did not work out for
Enron's benefit. But one ought to be cautious about generalizing from the
Enron case. Many, if not most, transactions in which Enron implemented
its view of conflicts-divorcing employees from loyalties except to them-
selves-may have been responsible for Enron's successes. Most certainly,
if the Subcommittee and Powers Reports are right, then they not only judge
Enron, but they also negatively judge the strategies of all redesigned
corporations.
V. CONCLUSION
The analysis in this Article differs from most other analyses of Enron
because it is not focused on the deceptiveness of Enron's balance sheets
and its improper accounting practices. Rather, it focuses on Enron's bad
business deals. If change is necessary in corporate law, it is not just be-
cause of corporate non-compliance, but also because corporations need to
protect themselves from entering bad business deals.
159 ENRON'S COLLAPSE, supra note 2, at 57.
160 Id.
161 Id. They were described as "close to Enron management." Id.
162 Id. at 57.
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This Article differentiates itself from other analyses because it inter-
prets Enron's problems as problems of redesigned corporations generally.
In focusing on the risk management function, this Article's hope is to raise
concerns, not resolve them. If corporations without bureaucracy can be
worthy of public trust, their risk management systems need to offer assur-
ances of accountability.
In criticizing corporate law's reliance on the model of an organization
as a bureaucracy, this Article is useful as much in criticizing present policy
initiatives as in suggesting where to look for alternatives. Consider Sar-
banes-Oxley's requirement that executives sign financial statements. What
did this accomplish? "Top management is signing off based on reports
certified by their immediate subordinates, who are in turn signing off based
on reports certified by their subordinates, down the chain of command."'63
Treat the corporation as a bureaucracy and one gets meaningless bureau-
cratic responses that will not alter the behavior of redesigned corporations.
One way of looking at redesigned corporations is to imagine them in a
European context, understanding that they rely on work councils, rather
than including employee (including working professional) representatives
on their boards. Instead of having officers and directors direct transactions,
self-managing teams do. A basic lesson of corporate organizations is that
the more reliable corporate internal controls are, the less there is a need for
intrusive auditing. The task for redesigned corporations, and the law to the
extent it is able, is to govern these work councils by improving internal risk
management controls. To do so, risk management groups need to be un-
derstood. This Article hopes to begin the process of seeking such under-
standings.
163 Steve Seidenberg, Compliance Alert, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 26, 2002, at A 14.
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